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6. A necessary truth is not impossible 
from 2 and 3 together. But what is not impossible might be true or might 
be false. Since according to 1 what is necessarily true could not possibly 
be false, Mr. Bar-Hillel is back with the original paradox. I do not see 
therefore that he has made any progress toward a solution. 
Mr. Bar-Hillel thinks too that it is a blunder to say that "if what is pos- 
sibly true could not be false then it would be necessarily true." Perhaps 
he would be able to see the point a little more readily were it stated as 
7. If what is possibly true could never be false, it would be necessarily 
true. 
But  Mr. Bar-Hillel seems to have something else in mind, for on page 92 
he interprets 4 to mean 
4'. W h a t  is contingently true could be false 
and on page 93 interprets it to mean 
4". W h a t  is not impossible could be false. 
He  seems to be holding that 4' is necessarily true, and 4" is false. But 
why he thinks this is not clear. 
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A CRUCIAL question concerning the logic of the language we use in talking 
about  some of our "inner" experiences concerns the sense in which we 
can be said to misreport or misremember them. An examination of this 
issue will help us to see why, in philosophy, we are sometimes tempted to 
speak of such experiences as "private" or "hidden" from others while know- 
able only to ourselves. In these philosophical moods we are inclined to say 
that only I know what I am saying to myself. Others may guess or have 
beliefs on this matter but  only I know. Similarly, in the matter of dreams, 
I seem to be in a position of "privileged access." I know at first hand what 
I dream, while others must rely on more or less good but  indirect evidence. 
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It is my view that the chief source of our dit~culties in this area lies in 
an uncritical use of such key words of the fact-stating use of language as 
"know," "believe," "fact," and "report." We mistakenly import the logic 
of these expressions, when employed in straightforward fact-stating uses, 
into the entirely different set of uses of language involved in reporting such 
things as our dreams and silent soliloquies. 
I should like in this note then, to indicate some of the important differ- 
ences between reporting such things as the number of chairs in a room and 
reporting "private" experiences such as dreams. One important distinction 
to be used here comes from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations 
(Part II, xi). "The criteria for the truth of the confession that I thought 
such-and-such are not the criteria for a true description of a process. And 
the importance of the true confession does not reside in its being a correct 
and certain report of a process. It resides rather in the special consequences 
which can be drawn from a confession whose truth is guaranteed by the 
special criteria of truthfulness." 
W~hat is the contrast which Wittgenstein is here making between the 
concept of truth and the concept of truthfulness? The criteria for the 
truthfulness of a report are iust the criteria which are used in deciding 
that the reporter is not telling a lie (but is speaking truthfully). One point 
of \Vittgenstein's remark is the observation that the criteria for the truth 
of our reports on our thoughts are iust the criteria for the truthfulness of 
these reports. 
Consider the distinction between the truth of a report on, say, the num- 
ber of chairs in the next room and the truthfulness of such a report. It is 
clear that the concepts are distinct in this case, since I can give a false 
report even though I fully intend to give a true one. But in the case of 
reporting our dreams (thoughts, imaginations, silent soliloquies) the whole 
notion of the correctness of the report, as distinct from its truthfulness, 
seems to lose its point. The reason for this is connected up with the fact 
that the sense in which others' reports on their dreams can be said to 
"agree" with the "facts" they report is quite different from the kind of 
agreement involved in the more obvious sorts of factual statements. For 
I must finally rely on the account which others give as to the content of 
their dreams (thoughts, images). I can question the truthfulness of these 
accounts, but not (independently of this) their truth. And this makes the 
very notion of a "report" seem idle here. Against someone's truthful ac- 
count as to the content of his dreams, nothing logically can count as con- 
clusive evidence that the account is false except another of his truthful 
accounts. Wittgenstein seems to be making this point when he says (Part 
II, xi), "Assuming that dreams can yield important information about the 
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dreamer, what yielded the information would be truthful accounts of 
dreams. The question whether the dreamer's memory deceives him when 
he reports the dream after waking cannot arise, unless indeed we introduce 
a completely new criterion for the report's 'agreeing' with the dream, a 
criterion which gives us a concept of 'truth' as distinct from 'truthfulness' 
here." 
But suppose now that we shift from a consideration of the correctness 
of other people's reports of their dreams to query our own accounts to 
others (or ourselves) of our own dreams. Am I in a position of privileged 
access? Can I make a comparison between my account and the thing itself 
which others are barred from making? It seems to me that this is not so. 
For all I can do is to accept the account which seems to be correct (sup- 
posing that I have given more than one account). As in the case of other 
people's dreams the criteria for the truth and the criteria for the truthful- 
ness were identical so in the case of my own accounts of my own dreams 
the criteria of correctness and the criteria for seeming to be correct become 
the same. Of course, I cannot query my own truthfulness. I can no more 
"compare" my account of my dreams with the dream itself than I can 
"compare" someone else's account of his dream with his dream. I may 
try to compare my account of my dream with what I remember myself 
to have dreamt. But what would count as establishing that I have mis- 
remembered my dreams? W e  don't, in practice, divide people into the two 
classes of those who remember correctly the contents of their dreams and 
those with poor memories in this respect. How could one tell to which 
of these two classes he (or anyone else) belongs? Well, perhaps imme- 
diately upon waking I wrote the dream clown in my diary and I find now 
(some time later) that my present recollection does not accord with this 
earlier written account. Which account shall I trust? Won ' t  I simply take 
the account which now seems to me correct? For as regards the correctness 
of my memory for the contents of my dreams there is no test for distin- 
guishing a correct memory from an incorrect one which only seems to be 
correct. And hence there really cannot be this sort of issue as to the cor- 
rectness of my memory for my dreams. 
Another way of getting to see the peculiar idleness of the question as 
to the correctness of a report (not its truthfulness) on a dream is to observe 
that nothing really can turn on this "issue." If someone gives me a false 
report as to the strength of a building badly shaken in an earthquake, this 
false report can result in the death of many human beings. But nothing 
turns on what we dream, though our accounts of them can be interesting 
and informative to psychoanalysts and perhaps to other people as well. 
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